The ongoing world credit crunch might well kill off the most recent bubble dynamics in the British housing market by driving prices systematically downwards from their 2007 peak. Nonetheless, the experience of that bubble still warrants analytical attention. The Labour Government might not have been responsible for consciously creating it, but it has certainly grasped the opportunities the bubble has provided in an attempt to enforce a process of agential change at the heart of the British economy.
Introduction
On May 13 th 2008 Caroline Flint, Housing Minister in the Brown Government, was photographed in Downing Street on her way to a private Cabinet meeting which had been called to discuss the problems then afflicting the British housing market.
1
For the whole of New Labour's first decade in power, the sustained period of significant year-on-year property price increases allowed British households to consume at a rate that exceeded their income from paid work. The additional consumption generated a strong macroeconomic growth performance. Under Gordon Brown's stewardship, the Treasury reacted to these emergent trends by attempting to lock-in the favourable price trajectory on the housing market. To that end, it sought to instil what it described as the 'savings habit' throughout society. The aim has been to provide a guaranteed flow of new entrants into the housing market in order to keep house prices buoyant. The Treasury has been eager to avoid the situation in which property purchases, especially involving first-time homebuyers, are conducted in the absence of savings. This had been the backdrop to the widespread experience of negative equity in Britain in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when falling house prices When the photographs were enlarged the contents of her briefing notes were clearly visible and found their way into the next day's newspapers. They contained the warning to her Cabinet colleagues that "we can't know how bad it will get", alongside the prediction that prices would fall in the following year by 10% "at best" (Guardian, 14.05.08) . This represented the latest in a long line of bad news stories for an increasingly beleaguered Government seeking sanctuary from the political fallout as the world credit crunch began to affect British house prices.
left the market price of many houses significantly below the level of outstanding mortgage repayments, thus contributing to further price falls as entry into the housing market stalled.
The analysis that follows is organized around this key contextual difference between the two most recent experiences of bubble dynamics in British house prices.
It is a tale of two distinct bubbles: the most recent one standing out from its predecessor insofar as it inflated in the context of conscious Government action designed to facilitate the savings culture within society. The rapid rise in house prices in Britain in the mid 1980s was a genuine market bubble, because it arose in the absence of direct political interventions aimed specifically at producing the resulting price effects. It was primarily the unintended consequence of the process of financial liberalization. The 'right to buy' initiative, inviting council tenants to purchase their properties at below the market rate, was of course an explicitly political act. It was also an integral part of the cultural politics of ownership in the 1980s. Yet, the selloff was pretty much complete before price increases reached their bubble stage and it also had a very different geography to the local conditions which led prices into that stage.
Viewed comparatively, the more recent price trajectory looks to be more consciously planned -if not at its point of origination then certainly at various points in its continuation.
(1) There have been any number of occasions on which fiscal measures could have been called upon to quell the surge in house prices but were deliberately ignored (e.g., Coates 2005: 173) . (2) The way in which inflation is measured in Britain has been changed to lessen the impact of the housing market on the calculations which forms the basis of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England's interest rate decisions (e.g., Keegan 2004: 207-8) .
The microeconomic incentive structure which Brown did so much to reconfigure during his time at the Treasury has been reoriented specifically to facilitate individuals' attempts to ride the back of the bubble (Gibb 2001: 357) .
The most important characteristics of the new microeconomic incentive structure relate to New Labour's desire for individuals to become personally responsible for the greater part of their consumption needs in old age. The backdrop to such a wish is the increasing acknowledgement in Government circles that the state pension will not be sufficient in the future to do that for them. The private pension holdings of British people continue to be mainly concentrated in a balance of equities and bonds as selected by their fund managers (e.g., Clark 2000) . However, the housing market has been presented as the ideal economic context in which savings in general can be made to grow for the purpose of enabling future consumption. In effect, then, the housing market has been incorporated into a new model of welfare provision at odds with many of the assumptions associated with the post-war British welfare state.
Such a shift has required significant social engineering. In order to deliver a citizenry capable of flourishing in a world of asset-based welfare, the Treasury under Brown set about the task of constituting monetary conservatives. The objective has been to create political subjects who will prevent the Government from introducing macroeconomic conditions which require the type of interest rate rises that burst the 1980s' house price bubble. If the housing market is to be used as the most important element of a system of asset-based welfare, house prices must be protected from interest rate rises. So, the success of such a strategy depends on creating an ever expanding constituency that will not authorize government spending plans financed from current deficits. Insofar as the current threat to British house prices has occurred in a context of falling rather than rising interest rates, it could be argued that the policy has been successful in its own terms. However, the effects of the world credit
crunch might yet prove a more decisive influence on short-term house prices than those of a macroeconomic regime designed to facilitate their rise.
In order to draw out the comparison between the two most recent British housing market bubbles, the paper proceeds in three stages. In section one, I develop the framework which helps me to make sense of the differences between the two bubble experiences. The crucial contextual factor in this respect is the change in political priorities regarding the management of the welfare state. The overriding goal of the Thatcher Government during the build-up to the 1980s' house price bubble was simply to restrict the scope of existing entitlements. In this sense, the trajectory of house prices was entirely divorced from attempts to recast the whole manner in which welfare was delivered in Britain. By contrast, the overriding goal of the Blair Government in the build-up to the 2000s' house price bubble was to catalyze an increasing shift towards asset-based welfare. Sections two and three subsequently apply the insights arising from the conceptual discussion to the two bubble experiences. Section two focuses on the bubble that burst in the late 1980s, as successive failures of macroeconomic policy in Britain led to the interest rate rises which tightened domestic credit conditions. Section three focuses on the more recent bubble. As of June 2008, this latter bubble has been sheltered from substantial interest rate rises, but its price structure appears to be just as susceptible to the ongoing world credit crunch.
The Housing Market as 'Two-Dimensional Super-Portfolio' under Conditions of

Asset-Based Welfare
Owner-occupied houses are not priced in Britain today according to a simple valuation technique linked to the costs of providing alternative accommodation and foregoing the standard rate of interest by tying up capital in long-term investments.
This would be to under-estimate the prices in evidence throughout the bubble periodand often dramatically so. There is now a deeply held sense within British society that activity on the housing market is not merely about providing oneself with somewhere to live. It is also about expecting to be able to cash-in future capital gains, and expectations of that nature form an important part of contemporary house price valuations. Such expectations had a tendency to be self-fulfilling for as long as the bubble remained inflated, thus placing clear upward pressure on actual prices for that period.
Given this, my intention is to develop a conceptual framework which can explain the trajectory of house prices in general as well as draw out both the shared and the separate characteristics of the two most recent British house price bubbles.
To begin, it is necessary to shift the focus of most asset valuation techniques, which tends to be on individual assets, so as to concentrate instead on the asset market as a whole. In this case, that means focusing on the housing market as a social institution embedded within the dominant governing strategy of the day. The intuition underpinning such a move is that houses are very rarely valued in isolation and on their own merits, so much as in relation to dominant price trends in the market as a whole.
Due to the social significance which is attached to owning a property in the 'right' area and being able to trade up to own more expensive properties, individual houses form part of an integrated homeowner investment strategy across society. The dominant price trend in every local segment of the housing market reflects dominant price trends elsewhere and, in this way, individual house prices quickly reflect changes in the price of other houses. As a result, the most important indicator of in which way and by how much the price of an individual house is likely to change is the underlying pattern of price changes in the housing market as a whole.
My explanatory framework rests on the assumption that the prices of I do so not as a substitute for the notion of a house price bubble but alongside it. A bubble implies a purely speculative price phase in which the psychology of crowds allows individual investors to systematically over-value a particular asset or group of assets (e.g., Shiller 2000) . Whilst there is clearly a speculative element to many of the house purchases in both of the episodes described in what follows, this is not their only feature. There is also a coordinated element to investments in houses, as individuals seek to 'play the market' by trading up their position within it. The speculative element to price formation does not disappear within such attempts, but it is always set within the context in which conditions in one local housing market shape those in all others. Viewed as a whole, the market is a social phenomenon to the extent that its underlying price trajectory within it reflects the coordinated efforts of individuals to issue social signals through their status as homeowners. By using the concept of a housing market super-portfolio alongside that of a house price bubble, it is possible to capture such a sense of coordination within the speculative price trend.
I use the notion of a bubble to apply to a specific trajectory of house prices, whereas I use that of a super-portfolio to apply to the broader features of price coordination within the housing market.
When treating the housing market conceptually as a super-portfolio of serially correlated house prices, a house price bubble can be seen as an asymmetric pricing trend within the super-portfolio. For Governments eager to appropriate the feel-good factor associated with rising house prices for their own electoral ends, the desired pricing trajectory of the housing market super-portfolio is one of continued increases.
New Labour has given exactly the same impression as its Conservative predecessor from the 1980s of wanting to claim political credit for presiding over a sustained period of house price rises. Yet, where it has differed has been in its attempts to such In other words, there is more than one way for house price bubbles to deflate.
They can fall prey to a weakening macroeconomic position when a sudden tightening of domestic credit is used as a corrective for general price inflation. This is the outcome that extra-economic support for macroeconomic stability is designed to overcome. Irrespective of the success of introducing such support, however, house price bubbles can also fall prey to exogenous shocks which are unrelated to domestic macroeconomic conditions. The ongoing impact on British house prices from the world credit crunch which began in the summer of 2007 seems to fit this latter scenario.
These, then, are the analytical parameters of the argument that I will employ in the rest of the article as a means of comparing the content of the two most recent . The aim of such a move is to encourage individuals to invest in assets at a point in the life cycle when current income is more than enough to sustain current consumption needs. On the proviso that these investments are in strongly performing assets, they can then be cashed-in as an expanded pool of savings to meet consumption needs in old age when current income is insufficient to do so.
The housing market was used throughout New Labour's first ten years in power as the primary means for securing such assets.
In effect, what has been created is a 'two-dimensional super-portfolio', in which one dimension relates to the serial correlation of asset-based wealth held in the housing market and the other dimension relates to the serial correlation of house prices themselves. The integration of the housing market into the welfare model links one household's ability to support their own consumption in old age to other households' ability to do likewise, at least insofar as all are attempting to expand their asset-based wealth through homeownership. As such, it should be clear just how much is at stake for the Brown Government at the time of writing, as confidence in the prevailing price structure of the British housing market continues to ebb. The whole of the Government's programme of welfare reform is now increasingly dependent on reproducing a stable and predictable pricing trajectory on the housing market. If house prices collapse then its strategy for incorporating people into an asset-based system of welfare looks unlikely to be successful.
The integration of the housing market into the welfare model acts as an extra line of defence for house prices, but only in certain circumstances. It does nothing to lessen the susceptibility of house prices to exogenous shocks whose origins lie in the world credit system. It only offers protection against the interest rate rises which deflate housing bubbles through the temporary tightening of domestic credit conditions. The increasing entrenchment of the second dimension of the later housing market super-portfolio makes it much less likely that social conditions will arise which subsequently lead to a change in domestic monetary policy of this nature. In general, sharp interest rate rises occur after a period of loose monetary policy, and this in turn tends to follow prior popular political mobilization to an expansionary macroeconomic policy. However, the move to an asset-based model of welfare makes this type of political mobilization, ceteris paribus, much less likely.
Given an appropriate degree of financial education, those people with savings invested in assets will know that the future value of their wealth holdings will be jeopardized by the interest rate response to previous periods of loose monetary policy.
As such, it is to be expected that they will resist mobilization to such a policy in the first place. The very act of holding assets as a means of financing future consumption
renders individuals increasingly open to political pressures for reconstituting themselves as monetary conservatives. Should they act upon these pressures in any widespread manner then the social conditions which lead to subsequent interest rate rises are unlikely to arise. As such, the macroeconomic conditions which create adverse impacts on the trajectory of house prices are less likely to be forthcoming than in the absence of societal demands for strict counter-inflationary policies.
The extent to which individuals have been reconstituted as monetary conservatives is reflected in the degree to which underlying macroeconomic conditions support the continuation of bubble dynamics in house prices. In turn, it also reflects the prior extent to which the housing market has been incorporated within the model of welfare. The remaining sections of the paper seek to shed light on these propositions by examining the two most recent British housing market bubbles and by showing how the first was unrelated to changing norms of welfare provision but the second was integrally embedded in such changes.
Bubble Number 1: The British Housing Market in the 1980s
When the Conservatives came to power in 1979, the structure of housing tenure in Britain divided pretty much along class lines. Homeownership was concentrated amongst the middle class and local authority renting amongst the working class. As James Cronin argues (2004: 209) , there was a noticeable lack of mobility between the two housing classes because both relied to a considerable extent on the state to secure their tenure. The rents on local authority housing were directly subsidized, and the widespread use of mortgage interest tax relief provided a similar degree of subsidization, albeit less directly, for owner-occupiers. The pattern of state expenditures thus entrenched individuals into particular housing classes on the assumption that housing was a merit good and should therefore be integrated into state provision of a minimum standard of living (Malpass 1996: 463) . The reforms to housing policy introduced by the Thatcher Governments were designed specifically to alleviate 'entry' constraints affecting owner-occupation and thus to create genuine market conditions for homeownership (Ford and Wilcox 1998: 625) In effect, they were intended to change the whole conception of housing from a merit good to an individualized investment vehicle capable of generating private wealth.
On their own, though, the reforms do little to explain either the subsequent trajectory of house prices in the mid 1980s or the specific content of the house price bubble that ensued. These came about as the unintended consequence of setting the new policy within the context of extensive changes to the financial system, all of which promoted widespread liberalization. It was these changes that fundamentally altered conditions on the supply-side of the mortgage lending market, relaxing entry constraints for many families who had previously been financially excluded from owner-occupation. It was the creation of more and more potential homeowners as a result of a large increase in available mortgage credit which represents the most important factor in the general upward trajectory in house prices in this period.
The Thatcher Government's financial liberalization programme had two main goals. The first was to undermine the embedded monopoly interests that had developed within the financial economy by exposing them to the disciplining effects of price competition. The second was to ensure that the free working of the price system allowed sufficient encouragement to financial entrepreneurs to introduce innovative investment products. Both of these impacts were apparent in the restructuring of the supply-side of the British mortgage lending market in the 1980s.
(1) The Thatcher Government overturned the privileged position of the building societies in providing personal finance for house purchases. In the early 1970s, the Heath Government granted cartel rights in the mortgage lending market to the Building Societies Association in return for the latter pegging the mortgage rate below the prevailing rate of interest (e.g., Grady and Weale 1986) . The cartellized regime thus created the conditions for relatively cheap mortgages, but this came at the cost of rationing the number of mortgages that could be made available. Thatcherite policy changed all this by the mid 1980s, most notably by lifting restrictions on the retail banks which had previously prevented them from operating mortgage lending businesses (e.g., Buckle and Thompson 1995) .
Three effects ensued for the housing market. First, the deregulation process (2) At the same time, the scope of feasible mortgage lending strategies widened due to the effects of a new process of mortgage securitization. Under such a process, the lender's exposure to a number of borrowers is bundled together into a single asset. The purchase of the mortgage-based asset, usually by a private equity fund created especially for the purpose, is financed by the issue of a relatively low-risk security constructed against the initial borrowers successfully meeting their mortgage repayments. The probability of a mass default on repayments is significantly lower than the probability of a default on any single repayment. The process of mortgage securitization consequently allows mortgage lenders to increase their exposure to the lending market without having to internalize a commensurable increase in risk (e.g., Langley 2006) . The banks cannot avoid credit risk altogether, but the profits they make from transaction fees in the securitization process offset an element of that risk and therefore enhance their overall balance sheet position.
In Britain, the process of mortgage securitization has historically concentrated on the repayment schedules of 'prime loan' borrowers (Council of Mortgage Lenders 2000). Yet, the very essence of the securitization technique is to shift the whole basis of what is presumed to be a 'marginal' lending case in both the prime and the nonprime sector. Securitization therefore provides entry into all segments of the mortgage lending market for people who would otherwise be treated as unacceptable credit risks for that particular segment. It thus expands the pool of potential homebuyers at a faster rate than additions to the supply of housing stock come onstream. This has the effect of feeding upward price pressures in the housing market as a whole.
The combination of mortgage securitization techniques and the introduction of genuine price competition amongst mortgage providers fundamentally altered prevailing supply-side conditions in the mortgage lending market in Britain in the 1980s. Whilst the previous building societies' cartel had led, in effect, to the rationing of new mortgages, the overall effects of financial deregulation created equally clear conditions of over-supply (Taylor and Bradley 1994: 369) . A house price boom ensued as mortgage providers over-lent to an increasingly buoyant housing market in the context of constrained supply of new housing stock (Wood and Capie 1996: 21) .
The results were dramatic. Adjusting for the effects of inflation, real house prices almost doubled between 1983 and 1989 . From 1985 to 1988 , the annual average percentage price rise of all houses was never less than double digits and, for 1988 alone, the figure was 24% (Malpass 1996: 465) . Such rises made house purchases and, by implication, mortgage lending increasingly unaffordable as a proportion of income, but this occurred at exactly the moment that ever greater numbers of people were being enticed to enter the market -ironically, by the allure of those self-same higher house prices.
This was a house price bubble created specifically as a market phenomenon Unsurprisingly, the combination of increasing retail price inflation, increasing mortgage rates and then overall economic recession proved to be a destabilizing cocktail for house prices. They fell increasingly sharply as the recession took hold, propelling the economy into an increasingly vicious cycle of recession and house price falls. Every reduction in house prices increased the real burden of credit repayments as a proportion of income for indebted households. This led to cutbacks in current consumption. But every reduction in current consumption deepened the recession and, with it, deepened also the falling confidence that was already adversely affecting house prices. Average house prices fell by around a quarter between 1989
and 1992 (Audas and MacKay 1997: 869) .
The worst affected people were those who had taken out new mortgages most recently in an attempt to improve their homeowner status. As a reflection of the dramatic surge in house prices from 1985 to 1988, in general they held the highest value mortgages as a proportion of current income. When the overall effect of negative equity peaked in the third quarter of 1992, 99% of households so affected had taken out a mortgage between 1988 and 1991. In total, this amounted to more than one-in-five homebuyers during that period (Gentle, Dorling and Cornford 1994: 191) . The introduction of genuine price competition into the mortgage lending market saturated it with potential supply and, coupled with the effects of securitization, persuaded many lenders to issue mortgages to support house purchases that were backed by little, or even no, cash down-payments. The households most protected from the experience of negative equity were those who had made the largest cash down-payments on their house purchase out of accumulated savings. Two-thirds of house purchases with a 100% mortgage advance between 1988 and 1991 led to the experience of negative equity by the third quarter of 1992. This figure fell to around one-third for house purchases backed by a 10% deposit and only one in a thousand for house purchases backed by a 30% deposit (ibid.: 192).
The negative equity trap was responsible for further chasing house prices downward and, as confidence in the pricing structure of the market as a whole eroded, serial downside correlation ensued. In both phases of the bubble, the prices of individual houses were affected most obviously by the average price of houses in the market overall. The most important feature of the housing market super-portfolio in this period was that its internal characteristics and pricing trajectory were shaped almost solely by institutional changes to the supply-side of the mortgage lending market. The fact that there was no clearly visible extra-economic dimension to the super-portfolio made serial downside correlation in house prices just as likely as serial upside correlation. Throughout its life, the bubble remained susceptible to credit shocks arising from domestic macroeconomic conditions.
Bubble Number 2: The British Housing Market in the 2000s
Looking simply at the trajectory of house prices, the most recent British housing market bubble replicates many of the features of its predecessor. Indeed, the price increases for the most extreme year of the earlier bubble, 1988, are almost directly None of these apparent echoes of the former situation mean, however, that the two bubble experiences are generically the same, despite the fact that both arose from a political context emphasizing housing as a means of accumulating private wealth rather than as a social right. The earlier one was a purely market-based phenomenon, whilst the continuation of the latter has been tied much more closely to matters of political strategy. The core substantive features of the earlier one were focused on changes in the supply-side of the mortgage lending market, whilst those of the latter were focused on changes in the demand-side of the mortgage lending market.
The negative equity of the 1980s was experienced most acutely amongst borrowers who had purchased houses on the basis of very little or even no cash deposit. The bubble was created in the first place on the supply-side of the mortgage lending market, but its downside price phase was initiated through a seizure on the demand-side of that market, as asset-poor borrowers were exposed by falling house prices. By comparison, New Labour's designs for an asset-based system of welfare have offered a degree of protection for the demand-side of the mortgage lending market. The current difficulties have arisen instead as a result of the world credit crunch having undermined the prior strength of the supply-side of that market. The Government's wish for individuals to become active asset-managers emphasizes the advantages of entering the housing market from the basis of already having accumulated assets. The surest defence against experiencing negative equity when house prices turn down arises from the buffer that comes with having paid a cash deposit on the house. The closer that the mortgage advance comes to 100% of the original purchase price, the smaller is the required decline in price before the household is subjected to negative equity. Savings thus become significant.
Towards the end of its first term the Labour Government set itself the task of facilitating saving in an attempt to encourage people to create an asset base for themselves (e.g., HM Treasury 2001b). This has particularly been the case amongst the low income families who are usually those that lack assets. The policy has been enacted through a combination of moral directive ('do not be responsible for passing on impeded life chances to your children by depriving them of an inherited asset base'), fiscal incentives ('why bother to pay taxes on a proportion of income that can be invested tax-free in special savings accounts?') and government intervention ('if you can begin to build an asset base for someone previously denied access to one then the government will match your savings out of the public purse'). Alan Of course, such values have multiple roots, so it is highly unlikely that there will be a simple one-to-one relationship between the degree of asset ownership and political attitudes. But it is also largely unthinkable that no effect on policy preferences will be forthcoming in situations in which individuals have both a greater value of assets to defend and a greater reason to wish to defend them because of the declining real worth of the state pension and the need to make good the ensuing deficit through personal wealth. Put simply, if individuals have more assets then they are likely to want to defend them politically. Homeownership dominates wealth holdings in Britain to such an extent that the defence of asset-based wealth is, to a large degree, the defence of house prices. But the prevailing super-portfolio of house prices can only be given protection against the effects of macroeconomic instability on domestic credit conditions, and only then through the institutionalization of a conservative monetary policy. As the Treasury has argued (2000: 11), "People need to be able to save without fear that the value of their savings will be eroded by rapidly rising prices [i.e., consumer prices]". It is likely, then, that the incorporation of individuals into an asset-based system of welfare centred on increasing house prices will facilitate the political remaking of individuals as monetary conservatives.
Responsibility for policing the policy regime that reproduces inflated house prices has therefore been passed on from government to society. This is consistent with the prevailing idea that housing is in any case a means of accumulating private wealth rather than a right drawn against the state. New Labour has continually asked to be judged on its success in creating a low-cost credit environment in which interest rates are held in check by credible counter-inflationary performance (e.g., HM
Treasury 2006). That success has been difficult to question. The interest rate record of New Labour's first ten years in office was a definite spur for activity on the British housing market.
However, for the same ostensibly virtuous circle to be guaranteed for the future, it must be the case that the health of the housing market depends on nothing other than individuals' material interest in buoyant house prices continuing to generate demands for strict counter-inflationary policies. So long as the British economy can withstand exogenous shocks, the constitution of monetary conservatives does make it more likely that interest rates can be managed without any sharp spikes, as monetary conservatives will be less resistant to pre-emptive strikes against latent inflationary tendencies. Yet, as current circumstances demonstrate only too clearly, this is a very big proviso. The housing market will almost certainly be a beneficiary of the remaking of political subjectivities in line with monetary conservatism, but only when the sole threat to house prices has its origins in domestic macroeconomic conditions. It can never be enough on its own to protect the housing market superportfolio against all exogenous shocks.
The housing market situation under New Labour is rather more complex than a pure price bubble originating solely from the internal dynamics of the supply-side of the mortgage lending market. The extra-economic dimension associated with the integration of the housing market into an asset-based system of welfare is every bit as important for our understanding of the upward price phase as its economic dimension.
The current situation could not have arisen in the way it has in the absence of the Government's concerted attempts to change the model of welfare provision in Britain to one that emphasizes the personal ownership of assets. Yet, this cannot guarantee that the impact of the ongoing world credit crunch will not unwind the current structure of prices in the same way as if it was indeed a pure price bubble.
Conclusion
It is always misguided to try to generalize from current pricing trends in the The Labour Government might not have been responsible for deliberately engineering the onset of the most recent bubble, but it has certainly staked much on its continuation. New Labour's ability to guide the economy successfully through a period of welfare reform appears to be dependent upon the vitality of the housing market, as does its political popularity. The increasing unaffordability and inaccessibility of private housing stock in Britain spells trouble for the Government in both these respects. Yet, this might still pale into insignificance against the effects on house prices of the world credit crunch.
